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JUDICIAL AUDIENCES: A CASE STUDY OF JUSTICE
DAVID WATT’S LITERARY JUDGMENTS
Elaine Craig*
I

n 2016, the government of Canada announced reforms to
the federal judicial appointment process aimed at increasing openness and transparency in the process. As part of those changes, all
applicants for appointment to, or elevation within, the federal judiciary are required to submit responses to a new questionnaire. Applicants are asked to reflect upon the role of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system. One of the questions they are asked is: “Who is
the audience for decisions rendered by the court(s) to which you are
applying?” While the audience for a court’s decisions is not a new
matter of academic and professional discussion, this recent change
has brought judicial audience more squarely into the public eye.
Nearly every successful applicant, of those whose responses are
available, highlighted three key constituencies that should be addressed in every court decision: the parties, the public, and the legal
profession.
Justice David Watt’s short, staccato style introductions to decisions, authored since his elevation to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, have received attention. His introductions, which differ from
the conventional style of legal judgments, have been the subject of
legal blogs, mainstream media articles, and professional praise and
criticism. Decisions that include intentional stylistic departures
from conventional judicial writing are sometimes referred to as literary judgments. These so called literary judgments, including the
ones written by Justice Watt, raise particular issues regarding the
notion of judicial audience. Justice Watt’s departure from the conventional style of legal writing, particularly given the gruesome and
tragic facts involved in many of the decisions he has written, raises
numerous questions: Who is the audience for these literary judgments? Do judges write for a different readership when they issue
decisions which depart significantly from the traditional style of legal writing? What are some of the attendant risks of delivering literary judgments to particular audiences? Do Justice Watt’s literary
judgments speak appropriately and productively to the three constituencies for court decisions identified by judges themselves: the
parties (understood broadly), the public, and the legal profession?
Using Justice Watt’s decisions as a case study, this article considers
the issue of judicial audience in the context of literary judgments.
The article proceeds in three sections, each dedicated to an examination of Justice Watt’s literary decisions in relation to one of these
three audiences.

*

E

n 2016, le gouvernement du Canada a annoncé des réformes du processus de nomination judiciaire fédéral visant à
accroître l’ouverture et la transparence du processus. Dans le
cadre de ces changements, tous les candidats à une nomination
ou à une promotion au sein de la magistrature fédérale sont tenus de répondre à un nouveau questionnaire. Les candidats
sont invités à réfléchir sur le rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans le
système juridique canadien. L’une des questions qui leur est posée est la suivante : « Quelle est l’audience à laquelle s’adressent
les décisions rendues par le ou les tribunaux auxquels vous postulez ? » Bien que l’audience des jugements ne soit pas
un nouveau sujet de discussion académique et professionnelle, ce
récent changement a permis de mieux faire connaître au public
l’audience des tribunaux. Presque tous les candidats retenus,
parmi ceux dont les réponses sont disponibles, ont mis en évidence trois groupes clés qui devraient être abordés dans chaque
décision : les parties, le public et la profession juridique.
Les introductions courtes et staccatos dans les décisions
du juge David Watt, rédigées depuis son élévation à la Cour
d’appel de l’Ontario, ont attiré de l’attention. Ses introductions,
qui diffèrent du style conventionnel des décisions judiciaires, ont
fait l’objet de blogs juridiques, d’articles de journaux et de
louanges et critiques professionnelles. Les décisions qui comportent des écarts stylistiques intentionnels par rapport à la rédaction judiciaire conventionnelle sont parfois appelées des « jugements littéraires ». Ces jugements dits littéraires, y compris
ceux rédigés par le juge Watt, soulèvent des questions particulières concernant la notion d’audience judiciaire. Le fait que le
juge Watt s’écarte du style conventionnel de la rédaction juridique, notamment en raison des faits macabres et tragiques qui
sont impliqués dans nombre des décisions qu’il a rédigées, soulève de nombreuses questions : Quelle est l’audience de ces jugements littéraires ? Les juges écrivent-ils pour un lectorat différent lorsqu’ils rendent des décisions qui s’écartent considérablement du style traditionnel de la rédaction juridique ? Quels
sont les risques liés au fait de rendre des jugements littéraires
pour des audiences particulières ? Les jugements littéraires du
juge Watt s’adressent-ils de manière appropriée et productive
aux trois groupes de lecteurs identifiés par les juges eux-mêmes :
les parties (au sens large), le public et la profession juridique ?
En utilisant les décisions du juge Watt comme une étude de cas,
cet article examine la question de l’audience judiciaire dans le
contexte des jugements littéraires. L’article se divise en trois
sections, chacune consacrée à l’examen des décisions littéraires
du juge Watt par rapport à l’une de ces trois audiences.
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Introduction: For Whom do Judges Think They are Writing?
In 2016, the Government of Canada announced reforms to the federal
judicial appointment process aimed at increasing openness and transparency in the process.1 As part of those changes, all applicants for appointment to, or elevation within, the federal judiciary are required to submit
responses to a new questionnaire. Applicants are asked to reflect upon the
role of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system. One of the questions they
are asked is: “Who is the audience for decisions rendered by the court(s) to
which you are applying?”2 Excerpts from the responses to the questionnaire by successful applicants (which would include newly appointed
judges as well as those who were already appointed but have been elevated to a higher court) are made publicly available.3 While the audience for
a court’s decisions is not a new matter of academic and professional discussion, this recent change has brought judicial audience more squarely
into the public eye.
A review of the available applications to the federal judiciary reveals
broad consensus among successful applicants regarding the audiences
that should be addressed in judicial decisions.4 Applicants to the federal
judiciary also seem to agree, as do academic commentators,5 that in judicial writing “[knowing and] understanding one’s audience is crucial.”6 The
audience identified by these judges is wide. Justice Deborah Swartz, for
example, notes in her application that “[t]he audience for decisions rendered in the Ontario Superior Court are our neighbors across the fence,
next door, in the next city, farm, village and province.”7 Nearly every successful applicant, of those whose responses were available at the time of
1

See Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada Announces Judicial
Appointments and Reforms the Appointments Process to Increase Openness and
Transparency” (20 October 2016), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.
canada.ca> [perma.cc/E8RS-N67L].

2

Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Guide for Candidates”
(October 2016), online: Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada
<www.fja-cmf.gc.ca> [perma.cc/Z3DE-6NB5]. This question appears in Part 11(4) of the
Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments made available through the online
Guide.

3

See Department of Justice, “Judicial Appointments” (20122017), online: Department of
Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca> [perma.cc/9EDZ-UPNK] [Department of Justice,
“Judicial Appointments”].

4

See ibid.

5

See e.g. Michael J Higdon, “The Legal Reader: An Exposé” (2013) 43:1 NML Rev 77.

6

Ibid at 81.

7

Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Deborah Swartz’s Questionnaire (Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment) (7 April 2017) at Part 11(4), online: Department of
Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/73EK-S7JR].
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writing, highlighted three key constituencies that should be addressed in
every decision: the parties, the public, and the legal profession. For example, in his application for elevation to the Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Justice David Paciocco summarized these audiences as follows:
There are three constituencies that should be spoken to in judicial
decisions. The primary audience for any judicial decision is the “parties” to the proceeding, understood in a broad sense. It is equally important, however, that judges speak in their decisions to the public
at large, to whom the law belongs. And there is an additional primary audience for appellate court decisions, in particular, namely lawyers and judges. A worthy judicial decision is crafted with all of
these three constituencies in mind, and is crafted in a way that enables all of them to understand.8

The style of writing embraced by most judges is formal, somewhat
technical, and impersonal. In relation to the issue of judicial audience, the
stylistic norms of conventional judicial writing raise important questions
regarding accessibility and tone. However, consideration of the audience
for a court’s decision may be of particular interest and import when assessing judicial writing that is unorthodox.
Justice David Watt’s short, staccato style introductions to decisions,
authored since his elevation to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, have received attention.9 His introductions, which differ from the conventional
style of legal judgments, have been the subject of legal blogs,10 mainstream media articles,11 and professional praise and criticism.12 This aspect of Justice Watt’s judicial writing has been likened to that of a crime
fiction novel and the work of American novelist Elmore Leonard, in par-

8

Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice David M Paciocco’s Questionnaire
(Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment) (7 April 2017) at Part 11(4), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/8JX4-V3CV] [Paciocco Questionnaire].

9

See e.g. James Morton, “Speaker’s Corner: Watt Deserves Praise for Clarity”,
Law Times (28 March 2011) online: <www.lawtimesnews.com> [perma.cc/UL2EF4QU]; Simon Fodden, “Watt’s the Matter?” (11 March 2011), online (blog): Slaw
<www.slaw.ca> [perma.cc/EHQ2-H6SA].

10

See e.g. Fodden, supra note 9; Nancy McCormack, “Developments in Canadian Law
and Law Libraries” (2011) 19:2 Austl L Librarian 148.

11

See Kirk Makin, “The Judge Who Writes like a Paperback Novelist”,
The Globe and Mail (10 March 2011) online: <theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/KM28KUK7]; Andrew Duffy “A Judge’s Flair for the Dramatic”, Ottawa Citizen (2 January
2013) D1; Katie Daubs, “Legal Decision with Literary Flourish and Dry Wit Making
Rounds in Toronto Legal Circles”, The Toronto Star (29 March 2013) online:
<www.thestar.com> [perma.cc/WZX6-AM2M] (quoting Watt’s decision in Flores CA, infra note 24).

12

See Morton, supra note 9; Makin, supra note 11.
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ticular.13 Justice Watt is an accomplished judge. His legal reasoning is
concise, rigorous, and rooted in a deep knowledge of the law, particularly
in matters of criminal and evidence law. The style, tone, and content of
his introductions reflect a notable departure from his legal writing more
generally.
Many of the cases Justice Watt has introduced using this style of writing involved criminal law matters. The first paragraph of his decision in
R. v. Cyr is illustrative:
A jury decided that Paul Cyr (the appellant) was not only a chicken
thief but also a killer. A chicken thief because he hijacked a tractortrailer unit carrying about 14,000 kilograms of frozen chickens, then
sold the chickens to some food wholesalers eager for a bargain. A
killer because he shot the truck driver in the back of the head and
left him dead in the cab of his truck.14

A significant number of the criminal cases in which Justice Watt has
used this style of writing involved serious and very tragic factual circumstances. For instance, he begins his decision in R. v. Luciano with: “On a
cold weekend in late January 2000, the lengthy but brittle relationship
among Michael Luciano, Colleen Richardson-Luciano and James Cooper
ended. Abruptly and violently. First, in Woodbridge. Then, in Egmondville. Two deaths.”15 In R. v. Simon he writes: “Handguns and drug deals
are frequent companions, but not good friends. Rip–offs happen. Shootings do too. Caveat emptor. Caveat venditor. People get hurt. People get
killed. Sometimes, the buyer. Other times, the seller. That happened
here.”16
Justice Watt has used this style of writing to introduce a variety of
criminal cases, including several that involved violence against women. In
R. v. Boukhalfa, for example, Justice Watt opens his decision to uphold a
murder conviction as follows: “Shortly before Christmas a few years ago,
John Boukhalfa killed his mother. He hit her on the head with a baseball
bat. And stabbed her with a knife. Repeatedly.”17
Decisions that include intentional stylistic departures from conventional judicial writing are sometimes referred to as literary judgments.18
13

See Makin, supra note 11.

14

2012 ONCA 919 at para 1.

15

2011 ONCA 89 at para 1.

16

2010 ONCA 754 at para 1.

17

2017 ONCA 660 at para 1.

18

For a general discussion of judicial writing style and “law and literature,” see Richard A
Posner, “Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?)” (1995) 62:4 U Chicago L Rev
1421–25.
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These so-called literary judgments, including the ones written by Justice
Watt, raise certain issues regarding the notion of judicial audience. In
particular, given the gruesome and tragic facts involved in these cases,
Justice Watt’s departure from the conventional style of legal writing raises numerous questions: Who is the audience for these literary judgments?
Do judges write for a different readership when they issue decisions which
depart significantly from the traditional style of legal writing? What are
some of the attendant risks of delivering literary judgments to particular
audiences? Do Justice Watt’s literary judgments speak appropriately and
productively to the three constituencies for court decisions identified by
judges themselves: the parties (understood broadly), the public, and the
legal profession?
Using Justice Watt’s decisions as a case study, the remainder of this
article considers the issue of judicial audience in the context of literary
judgments. The article proceeds in three Parts, each dedicated to an examination of Justice Watt’s literary decisions in relation to one of these
three audiences.
Part I considers the interested and affected parties to a legal proceeding as a primary audience for the decisions of a court. This Part examines
four decisions authored by Justice Watt, involving the rape, torture, murder or attempted murder of women, in which he attempts humour or uses
puns, parody, stark imagery and highly stylized and colloquial language
to introduce the violence, or factual circumstances surrounding the violence, in these cases. Justice Watt’s writing in these judgments does not
reflect the empathy and sensitivity that some judges have identified as an
important feature of writing that is intended for the parties.
Part II examines the public as a significant audience for judicial decisions. The four decisions analyzed in the previous Part—R. v. Flores, R. v.
Bradey, R. v. Shafia and R. v. Salah—all involved violence (or attempted
violence) against women. Part III highlights the two interrelated factors
that judges should consider when writing decisions involving genderbased violence with a view to the public audience these decisions are likely to receive. These factors are the crisis of public faith in the legal system’s ability to respond appropriately to incidents of gender-based harm,
and the importance of writing judicial decisions that do not obscure the
social context and dynamics that produce gender-based violence. Justice
Watt’s unorthodox writing in these four cases does not reflect consideration of these factors.
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Part III also scrutinizes Justice Watt’s literary judgments in relation
to the third constituency identified by judges and judicial applicants: lawyers and judges. This Part concludes that Justice Watt’s decisions in these
cases likely are written for a legal audience and that they are written in
this unorthodox style in an effort to capture the attention of the legal
reader. Part III also concludes that because of the disjuncture between
the style of writing in his introductions and the style of writing in the remaining bulk of these decisions, his unorthodox openings may catch, but
not sustain, the attention of legal readers. In addition, his style of writing
in these cases may instigate a socially undesirable reaction in the legal
reader. The article concludes with the proposition that judicial humility
might best facilitate the difficult task of writing court decisions that speak
productively to these three different constituencies.

I. Involved and Affected Parties are a Primary Audience for (Literary)
Judgments
Applicants to the federal judiciary are required to complete a questionnaire as part of the application process. The questionnaire asks them
to reflect upon the audience for judicial decisions. While none of the applicants quoted here were commenting on Justice Watt’s literary judgments,
their responses highlight a contrast in judicial approach to opinion writing—the very contrast that this article will explore. Nearly every successful applicant to the federal judiciary, of the applications made available to
the public, identified the affected parties as the most immediate audience
for the decisions of a court. In criminal cases, the involved and affected
parties include the accused (which will be discussed next) but also those
harmed by an accused’s alleged conduct. Commenting on judicial audience
in his application for elevation to Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice, Justice Nakatsuru states: “especially for offences of violence, victims and
their families need to be heard and their voices need to be validated. The
judicial system needs to be respectful of everyone. The needs and rights of
victims should never be forgotten in criminal trials.”19 As Justice Paciocco
writes, “human decency requires that a judgment speak to all of the parties in a broad sense – everyone who has a direct and material interest in
the case, whether they have standing or not.”20

19

Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Shaun S Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire
(Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment) (11 May 2017) at Part 11(4), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/5DRQ-33MJ].

20

Paciocco Questionnaire, supra note 8 at Part 11(4).
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Judicial writing that is intended for the involved and affected parties
in a case should be compassionate and humane.21 As Justice Benoît Moore
noted in his application for appointment to the Superior Court of Quebec,
it is ... important for a judge to remain mindful of the message that a
judgment transmits to the parties involved personally and emotionally in the dispute. Decisions must therefore be written with empathy and humanity, taking into account the fact that beyond simply
conveying the court’s ruling, words also carry weight, and the reasoning and the grounds have meaning.22

In his application, Justice Paciocco emphasized that
[t]he parties must be spoken to as real people and with appreciation
of the stake they have. In writing a decision judges should think of
“faces,” not “cases,” and they should consider and speak to those
“faces” in their decisions so that those decisions do not become disconnected and insensitive and so that their decisions are understood.23

Justice Watt’s unorthodox style of writing, used to introduce the acts
of violence perpetrated against women or their children in four recent
murder cases, suggests that the intended audience for these decisions did
not include the family and friends of these dead women (and children).
Each of the four cases involved the murder or attempted murder of women by men known to them. As noted in the introduction, Justice Watt uses
some combination of attempted humour, pun, stark imagery, parody,
highly stylized sentence structure, and colloquial language to introduce
the violence, or factual circumstances surrounding the violence, in these
four cases.

A. R. v. Flores, 2011
Consider the opening paragraphs of his decision to grant the accused’s appeal from conviction in R. v. Flores:
[1] They met in a bar in London. Melvin Flores and Cindy MacDonald. Soon, they became lovers. Then, Cindy got pregnant. Melvin
was excited about the prospect of fatherhood. He wanted to get married. Cindy did not share her lover’s excitement. She had an abortion.

21

See Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Benoît Moore’s Questionnaire,
(Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment) (31 March 2017) at Part 11(4), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/64AW-WYS8] [Moore Questionnaire]; Paciocco Questionnaire, supra note 8 at Part 11(4).

22

Moore Questionnaire, supra note 21 at Part 11(4).

23

Paciocco Questionnaire, supra note 8 at Part 11(4).
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[2] Cindy made it clear to Melvin that their relationship was over.
But Melvin continued his pursuit. He enlisted the assistance of some
of Cindy’s relatives to convince her to marry him.
[3] Early one morning in June 2006, Melvin Flores closed the book
on his relationship with Cindy MacDonald. With a butcher knife left
embedded in Cindy’s back. Fifty-three blunt force injuries.24

Justice Watt’s account of the violence in this case reads more like a
description of characters in a novel than a judicial decision recounting the
facts of a tragedy involving actual human beings. Cindy MacDonald was
twenty-seven years old when her ex-boyfriend murdered her. He killed
her after finding out that she had had an abortion during the course of
their relationship.25 He stated to the police shortly after the murder “...I
fucking stabbed her...she did not want my baby.”26 Flores told the police
“she had been fucking this guy and that he got her pregnant. Then I went
crazy.”27 Several times after they broke up, Flores phoned MacDonald’s
aunt, with whom the victim was close, telling her that he loved MacDonald and wanted her family to convince her to marry him. After MacDonald’s abortion, Flores told the aunt that “Cindy killed his blood” and that
“if he couldn’t have her, nobody would.”28
Cindy MacDonald was described as “vibrant and fun loving.”29 (Not by
Justice Watt, whose description of her, other than details about her relationship with the accused, included only her age, the fact that she lived
with her father—a long haul trucker—and the allegation that she was “a
regular user of, if not addicted to, crack cocaine”).30 Justice Helen Rady,
who presided over Flores’s second trial and sentencing, reportedly charac24

2011 ONCA 155 [Flores CA].

25

See ibid at para 18.

26

R v Flores, 2012 ONSC 2643 at paras 36, 38 [Flores 2012]. This quote is taken from the
evidence of a police officer who testified at Flores’s second trial. The trial decision in the
first trial was not reported. Justice Watt’s decision refers to Flores’s statements to this
officer, indicating that he also testified at the first trial. Justice Watt’s decision, unlike
the second trial judge, does not refer to the specific statements attributed to Flores by
the police but rather summarizes this evidence. However, it is reasonable to assume
that the evidence of this officer, which was recorded in his duty book, was the same at
both proceedings and thus that these statements were part of the appeal record before
Justice Watt (Flores CA, supra note 24 at paras 38–39, 44–51).

27

Flores 2012, supra note 26 at para 39.

28

Ibid at paras 50–53. This evidence was introduced by the victim’s aunt during Flores’s
first trial. She died between the first and second trials. Her evidence from the first trial
was read into the record in the second trial.

29

Jane Sims, “Melvin Flores? sentence from his second trial means he can apply for parole after 12 years instead of 15”, The London Free Press (14 December 2012), online:
<lfpress.com> [perma.cc/8SPE-8TY9].

30

Flores CA, supra note 24 at para 11.
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terized MacDonald’s death as “starkly horrific”.31 At the accused’s sentencing hearing after the second trial, Cindy MacDonald’s family described the deep loss the family has experienced as a consequence of her
death.32 Her father spoke of feeling numb and her brother described the
family’s sense of unfairness regarding the lengthy legal process that they
had endured.33
Consider what her family’s reaction to reading Justice Watt’s description of her murder might have been. Given the way in which Justice Watt
described her murder, is it reasonable to assume that his decision overturning the conviction of the man who murdered her was not written for
Cindy MacDonald’s family and friends? It seems unlikely that her father,
in whose home the murder occurred,34 would find Justice Watt’s sensationalist suggestion that “Melvin… closed the book on their relationship”
by stabbing his daughter fifty-three times with a “butcher knife”35 witty or
amusing, let alone “empath[etic] and human[e]”, to borrow the standard
identified by Justice Benoît Moore.36

B. R. v. Bradey, 2015
Justice Watt’s decision in R. v. Bradey, a case involving the rape, torture, and murder of a mentally disabled woman, begins:
Paul Bradey, Susanna Balogh and Matthew Sitte had a problem. In
the basement of the house they shared near Midland. For them, Katlin Cousineau was the problem. She was dead on the basement floor.
With burns all over her body. From a blowtorch.37

The accused in Bradey engaged in a series of sickening acts of violence
against Katlin Cousineau before they murdered her, creating what Justice Watt referred to in his introductory paragraph as their “problem” (the
physical presence of her beaten and burned body in the basement of
Bradey’s home). Before her death Kaitlin Cousineau was held in Bradey’s
basement, where she was forced to sleep on the concrete floor and use a
bucket to urinate and defecate.38 She was handcuffed to the rafters and
beaten with a two by four. Her vagina was burned with the nozzle of a
31

Sims, supra note 29.

32

See ibid.

33

See ibid.

34

See Flores 2012, supra note 26 at para 25.

35

Flores CA, supra note 24 at para 3.

36

Moore Questionnaire, supra note 21 at Part 11(4).

37

2015 ONCA 738 at para 1 [Bradey].

38

See ibid at para 16.
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blowtorch. She was anally raped with a broomstick. After being repeatedly burned with a blow torch on the arms, legs, shoulders, breasts, stomach
and legs she was left in Bradey’s basement, where she eventually died.39
Justice Watt described the accused’s plan to address their “problem”
as follows:
[2] Bradey, Balogh and Sitte were each in their own way responsible
for Katlin Cousineau’s death. None of them wanted to take the
blame for what they had done. So they devised a plan. And the purpose of the plan was to destroy any evidence about how Katlin
Cousineau died and who was involved in her death.
[3] The plan involved a fire. A blaze that would completely destroy
the house and any evidence about how Katlin Cousineau died. And
maybe Bradey, who owned the house, would be able to collect the
proceeds of the fire insurance policy he had placed on the house.
[4] The fire had to look accidental. And so it was that a yarn was to
be spun about a cooking accident and a “threesome” involving Sitte
and two girls. The story would serve two purposes. It would characterize the fire as accidental in origin. And it would provide an explanation for the absence of Bradey and Balogh from the house when
the fire started.
[5] The house burned down. But the story about the origins of the
fire was soon extinguished. Bradey, Balogh and Sitte got arrested.
Each was charged with offences arising out of the fire and unlawful
killing of Katlin Cousineau.40

Justice Watt used stylized language and an attempt at gallows humour to describe Kaitlin Cousineau’s murder. For example, he referred to
the presence of her raped and tortured body in the accused’s basement as
“a problem”. His introductory paragraph was blunt and dramatic, relying
on sentence fragments, and stark imagery: “For them, Katlin Cousineau
was the problem. She was dead on the basement floor.” He used highly
stylized, colloquial language to explain the accused’s attempt to conceal
their crimes (e.g., “and so it was that a yarn was to be spun...”). And he
developed a pun to explain that their “plan” had failed: “The house burned
down. But the story about the origins of the fire was soon extinguished.”
While the remaining 178 paragraphs of his decision are written in a more
formal, impersonal, and traditional legal style, it is the unconventional
and informal writing in the first ten paragraphs of this judgment that
communicates a chilling detachment from the humanity of Katlin Cousineau.
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See ibid at paras 17–28.

40
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The tone, style of writing, and attempt at humour in Justice Watt’s introductory paragraphs in Bradey can be contrasted with statements made
by Justice Harris at Balogh’s sentencing hearing. Justice Harris reportedly described the prolonged attack against Kaitlin Cousineau as “sadistic
torture” and indicated that the “callousness and inhumanity” of leaving
her to die in a cold basement had “left him shaken.”41 He characterized
her death as “one of ‘stark horror’.”42 To be clear the decision does go on to
recount the horrifying facts in this case, but it does so in a more conventional style. Sentencing hearings and the issuance of appeal decisions
serve different functions in the criminal justice process. The point of comparing Justice Watt’s introductory statements about this case with Justice Harris’ characterization of the victim’s death is simply to demonstrate
the degree of detachment in his opening paragraphs.
Bradey was tried and convicted of first degree murder by a jury. His
conviction was upheld by Justice Watt.43 Mathew Sitte pled guilty to second degree murder and Susanna Balogh to criminal negligence causing
death.44 At Balogh’s sentencing hearing, Katlin Cousineau’s mother reportedly advised Justice Roland Harris (who presided over the hearing)
that “she relives the nightmare of her daughter’s death every day.”45 She
testified that “the pain and anger is so overwhelming that [she] fear[s] it’s
going to eat [her] up.”46 Could introducing the facts of her daughter’s rape,
torture, and murder in this style and manner be characterized as an effort
to (as Justice Paciocco advocates) speak “to the parties as real people and
with appreciation of the stake they have” in the case?47 How would Kaitlin
Cousineau’s mother react to the fact that a publicly paid judicial officer
had, in a public document, used the facts of her daughter’s rape, torture,
and murder to develop a pun, attempt a joke, or display literary prowess?

C. R. v. Shafia, 2016
Justice Watt’s opening paragraphs in an appeal from conviction in R.
v. Shafia—a case involving the murder of four women by three of their
family members—deploys a similar style:

41

Roberta Avery, “Judge shaken by woman’s ‘sadistic’ death”, The Toronto Star (18 August 2007), online: <www.thestar.com> [perma.cc/V3UD-VCGZ].
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Bradey, supra note 37 at para 188.
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Ibid at paras 6–7.
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Avery, supra note 47.
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[1] Boaters who travel the Rideau Canal system between Colonel By
Lake and Lake Ontario pass through a series of locks at Kingston
Mills. Lock gates open. Boats enter. Lock gates close. Boats leave.
[2] But not always.
[3] One morning – June 30, 2009 – boaters could not enter Kingston
Mills Locks. Oil on the water of the upper lock. A closer look revealed its source. Something in the water.
[4] In the water was a Nissan Sentra. Driver’s window open. Ignition
off, but not locked. Headlights off. Seatbelts unfastened. Front seats
reclined. Rear name plate damaged.
[5] And inside the vehicle, a terrible loss of life. Four dead family
members. Three young women. One adult.
[6] About three weeks later, three arrests. Three members of the
same family. The father, mother and brother of the young women.
Each charged with four counts of first degree murder. 48

The four women victims in Shafia were found in a vehicle submerged
in the upper lock at Kingston Mills Lock near Kingston, Ontario. They
drowned. Three of the women had similar bruises to the scalp, which the
pathologist testified “were not of the kind that would be caused by striking the back of a padded seat, but rather required that a firm surface be
struck with a sufficient degree of force.”49 Three of the women were under
the age of twenty. They were murdered by their father, mother, and
brother. The fourth victim was the first wife of their father, in what was a
polygamous marriage. After the murders, the police recorded the father of
the three younger women referring to one of his daughters as “a
whore...in the arms of this or that boy”; stating, when speaking about one
of them, that she was a “shameless girl with a bra and underwear,” and
muttering “honourless girl”.50
The issues on appeal in Shafia involved the admissibility of expert
opinion concerning honour killings and the trial judge’s instructions to the
jury regarding that evidence, the Crown’s use of post-offence conduct by
the accused, as well as whether one of the three defendants (the brother)
was wrongly tried as an adult.51 While it is true that the victims were
found in a car submerged in the canal, the issues raised by the grounds of
appeal in this case did not relate in any way to boaters, the Rideau Canal
in particular, oil on the surface of the water, or the Canal’s system of
locks. Styles, as Richard Posner notes in his consideration of judicial writ48

2016 ONCA 812 at paras 1–6 [Shafia].

49

Ibid at para 84.
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Ibid at para 94.
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See ibid at para 7.
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ing, are optional.52 Justice Watt’s introductory paragraph, with its highly
stylized description of boaters and the opening and closing of locks, appears to be gratuitously included for dramatic effect.
To describe the location at which these four women were found Justice
Watt writes: “Boats leave. But not always...Something in the water.”53
Ross Guberman, arguing in favour of less conventional judicial writing,
suggests that an informal style of writing is sometimes used to bring a judicial writer closer to his or her intended audience.54 If the loved ones of
the victims form part of the intended audience for this decision, then introducing the horrific acts of violence perpetrated against these four
women in an irreverent opening paragraph seems unlikely to achieve this
result.

D. R. v. Salah, 2015
Justice Watt used a similar style of writing in his opening paragraphs
in R. v. Salah to describe murderous violence targeted at a woman whose
children ultimately became the victims:
[1] In the beginning, a message. In the end, a fire. And two dead
children.
[2] Cindy Rodgers was the messenger. She told her friends and acquaintances Randy Parish was a paedophile. Randy Parish decided
to silence Cindy Rodgers. Permanently. No messenger. No message.
Cindy Rodgers would die in a fire in her home where she lived with
her two young children.
[3] Randy Parish assembled a team to execute his plan. Two to set
the fire. A third to act as a lookout. And an alibi for Randy Parish.
[4] The fire was set. The house burst into flames. But Cindy Rodgers
escaped. She awakened neighbours to call 911. She ran back to her
home. But the extent and intensity of the fire prevented her from reentering the house. Her children were trapped. They died in the fire
as she watched in helpless horror.55

Justice Watt’s introductory description of the violence in this case includes the use of stark imagery and perhaps literary wit: “Cindy Rogers
was the messenger...Randy Parish decided to silence Cindy Rodgers.
Permanently. No messenger. No message.”56 This introduction does not
52

See Posner, supra note 18 at 1426.
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Shafia, supra note 54 at paras 1–3.
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See Ross Guberman, “What a Breeze: The Case for the ‘Impure’ Opinion” (2015) 16
Scribes J Leg Writing 57 at 60.
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use sensitivity and empathy as emphasized by recent applicants to the
federal judiciary in their comments on writing for the victims of crime and
their loved ones.57 Do the tone and style of the introductory paragraphs to
this judgment suggest an assumption that Cindy Rogers and the other
family and friends who loved these two children would not read this decision?
To summarize, the style of writing used in the introductions in each of
these four decisions does not seem consistent with the criteria that recent
applicants to the federal bench have identified as necessary when writing
for the emotionally invested lay persons connected with a criminal case.

E. Judicial Decisions Have Broad Public Accessibility in a Digital Era
The reported decisions of judges play a different, more public, role
than they have in any other era. Today these decisions are digitized,
searchable, and freely available to anyone with internet access.58 Links to
reported decisions are frequently included in media coverage of a case or
in blogs discussing the case. In addition to CanLII and the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s webpage, links to Justice Watt’s decisions in Flores CA,
Shafia, and Bradey can be found in either national media coverage or other online fora.59
It may have always been likely that interested and effected parties
would read a court’s decision involving the murder of their loved one. Given the broad accessibility of judicial decisions and the media’s reliance on
reported case law, friends and family of a murder victim today may be exposed to judicial writing about their loved one even if they do not read the
decision. In cases where the style and content of that writing deviates so
significantly from the norm for legal decisions that the writing itself becomes newsworthy, the likelihood of exposure is even higher. For instance, Justice Watt’s description of Cindy MacDonald’s murder by Melvin Flores has been repeatedly recited online, including in mainstream
national media.60 Even if her family did not read his whole decision, the
57

See Moore Questionnaire, supra note 21 at Part 11(4); Paciocco Questionnaire, supra
note 8 at Part 11(4).
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All of Justice Watt’s decisions discussed in this article are available online, for free, on
CanLII.
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See e.g. Michael Friscolanti, “Shafia ‘honour killers’ lose bid for new trial”, Maclean’s (2
November 2016), online: <www.macleans.ca/news/> [perma.cc/U79K-87CT] (with a link
to Shafia, supra note 54); Louise Tansey, “Likely Relevant, But Inherently Unreliable”
(11 January 2016), online (blog): Mack’s Criminal Law <dallas-mack-4x7v.
squarespace.com/> [perma.cc/S399-MBK7] (with a link to Bradey, supra note 37); Fodden, supra note 9.
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possibility that they were confronted with Justice Watt’s irreverent description of her murder, which has been quoted in the Globe and Mail,61
Ottawa Citizen,62 and Toronto Star,63 seems high.
Judges should choose their words with a view to the personallyinvested lay readers who are likely to read their judgments. This is true of
judicial writing in any context; it is particularly important in cases involving tragedy and human suffering.

F. Criminal Law Decisions Should be Written for the Accused
As noted, recent judicial applicants identified the parties as the most
immediate audience for the decisions of a court. In criminal law cases the
accused individual is the most important party to the proceeding. Do Justice Watt’s unorthodox introductions suggest that he was writing for the
accused in these cases? Judicial decisions authored for the accused arguably have at least two essential features that are lacking in Justice Watt’s
literary decisions.
The first characteristic is empathy for the circumstances of the accused individuals. Judicial empathy, as Thomas Colby explains, facilitates
a judge’s ability to view an issue from all perspectives.64 In turn, “an empathetic appreciation of the case from the perspective of all of the litigants” furthers a judge’s ability to conduct the reasonableness and proportionality assessments so central to many areas of law.65 Moreover, a
judge’s ability to “empathize with ordinary people...to be able to understand how the law hurts or helps people” is frequently identified by the
public as a fundamentally important judicial trait.66 According to Susan
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See Makin, supra note 11.
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See Duffy, supra note 11.

63

See Daubs, supra note 11.
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For a thorough explication of the relationship between empathy and judging, see
Thomas B Colby, “In Defense of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96:6 Minn L Rev 1944
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why judicial empathy is consistent with judicial neutrality. Colby argues that empathy
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empathetic appreciation of the case from the perspective of all of the litigants” (ibid at
1946) as a function of the reasonableness and balancing assessments judges are frequently required to do). See also Mary Anne Franks, “Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial
Empathy” (2011) 51:1 Washburn LJ 61 at 62 (rejecting the notion that judicial empathy
and judicial impartiality are incompatible).
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Bandes, the question is not whether judges should exercise empathy—she
assumes they should and unavoidably do exercise empathy, but that it is
often exercised selectively in favour of particular groups and perspectives.67 This selective empathy, she suggests, is sometimes mistaken for
unbiased judging. For Bandes the more salient questions ask for whom do
judges exercise empathy, are they aware of their own limitations and
blind spots, and what measures do they take to remedy these limits?68
One measure that helps to remedy these limits involves approaching one’s
judicial writing with humility. As will be discussed in the Conclusion,
writing with humility facilitates empathetic judgment that is not selective.
Unfortunately, the lack of empathy for the victims and their survivors
reflected in these introductions is echoed by a similar disregard for the
life-destroying circumstances in which the accused individuals in these
cases found themselves. Justice Watt’s irreverent attempts at humour,
colloquial language, and highly stylized tone to introduce the precipitating
facts in these cases do not communicate empathy for the perpetrators of
this violence—each of whom was facing the severe stigma, social condemnation, and extended periods of incarceration that come with murder convictions.
Whatever its intended function might be, the use of judicial humour in
appellate decisions in which an accused’s liberty is at stake is unlikely to
be sympathetic towards the accused as a reader. Consider Justice Watt’s
introduction in Manasseri, which although it did not involve a murder
charge, did involve the accused’s liberty: [1] Déjà vu all over again?
[2] Charlie Manasseri is in jail. He wants out of jail. [3] The last time Charlie Manasseri got out of jail, he got into trouble. He got arrested and sent
back to jail.69 The opening paragraphs of Manasseri seem to make light of
the accused and his legal circumstances.70 As noted, the introductions in
Flores CA and Bradey also include explicit attempts at humour, in addi-

partment of Justice, A Survey of Sexual Assault Survivors, by Tina Hattem, 2000-4E
(Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2000) (two surveys in which the majority of respondents identified empathy as important).
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tion to the highly stylized language and stark imagery used to craft the
introductory paragraphs of these decisions.
Empathetic writing requires attentiveness to the fact that the litigants in any case will be personally impacted by the outcome —often in
profound ways involving issues such as their financial security, the custody of their children, their perception of whether justice was achieved in
response to experiences of victimization, or their liberty.71 As former law
dean William Prosser stated in 1952: “The litigant has vital interests at
stake. His entire future, or even his life, may be trembling in the balance….”72 Michael Kirby, a former justice of the High Court of Australia,
has commented: “I learned in my earliest days at the Bar that most litigants do not regard a court case as funny in the slightest.”73
A court’s reasons should recognize that the accused persons in criminal proceedings will rarely find humour in his or her circumstances. Empathetic judicial writing engages directly with the subject of its judgment.
It describes unflattering and painful details of the accused’s life or behavior with sensitivity and connects these conditions to the legal issues that
must be addressed—making it clear to the reader why these details are
relevant to the decision. Justice Watt’s introductions do not reflect this
style of writing. Consider, for example, his decision in R. v. Huard:
[1] Three crack users in Windsor had a plan. It was a simple plan.
Set up a drug deal. Show up at the designated place, at the appropriate time. Rip off the dealer. Grab the crack cocaine. Run.
[2] A problem developed in the execution of the plan. The dealer was
not alone. A fight started. One of the crack users got stabbed. All
three left empty-handed.
[3] Two days later, two men approached another drug dealer on a
street corner. This time, a shot was fired. The dealer died. The two
men fled.74

Perhaps most important for the purposes of this discussion, empathetic judicial writing reflects explicit recognition of its context and role as judicial writing—in these cases writing that authorized fundamental and
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long-term deprivations of an individual’s liberty.75 Justice Watt’s introductions in Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah (and cases like Manasseri
and Huard) are not consistent with the markers of empathetic judicial
writing.
A second characteristic of judicial writing that is aimed at the accused
(and interested and affected parties and other lay readers more broadly) is
accessibility. In his application for appointment Justice Benoît Moore noted that “the primary role of court decisions is…to render justice in such a
way that litigants who are concerned and affected by a ruling are able to
understand the logic and reasons behind it, even if they do not agree with
it.”76 In his view, access to justice requires judges to make the law accessible to the parties through plain language.77
Some readers have defended Justice Watt’s unorthodox introductions
on the basis that they render the decisions more readable and accessible.78
As already noted, Justice Watt’s introductions have been likened to that
of a crime fiction novel.79 In “Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion,”
Adalberto Jordan suggests that better use of language, including reliance
on imagery and humour, would make the law more understandable to the
public.80 Is the style of Justice Watt’s introductory paragraphs in cases
like Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah likely to make the law—the legal issues in these decisions—more comprehensible to the accused (or
other lay readers)?
English professor Greig Henderson, in his examination of some of Justice Watt’s decisions, asserts that Justice Watt’s writing is inspired more
by Lord Denning’s style of judicial authorship than by the crime novel
genre.81 Lord Denning used plain language, short sentences, and a narrative style that is similar to that of Justice Watt’s literary introductions.82
75
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Henderson concludes, however, that Justice Watt’s literary decisions are
only a partial imitation of Lord Denning’s celebrated text.83 Henderson
notes that while Justice Watt uses plain language in his openings, he
writes for a legal audience throughout the remainder of the decisions,
whereas Denning “writes for the public all the way [through].”84
Analyzing Justice Watt’s decision in Ontario v. Enbridge85, Henderson
writes: “the problem with Watt’s opening is its incongruence with the rest
of the judgment. The first three paragraphs are terse and fragmented. In
the fourth paragraph, however, the paperback novelist disappears and the
traditional judge takes over.”86 The preponderance of the decision, Henderson writes, is “[a]imed at a professional audience” using a formalist
style, which “sees the law as logical, objective, and constrained. Such a
style is impersonal, elevated, technical, and conventional.”87
While his study did not discuss the cases examined here, Henderson’s
analysis captures the format, style, and structure of Justice Watt’s writing in Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah. The style, language, and
tone of his factual descriptions in these four cases (and in other criminal
cases introduced in a similar manner)88 are incongruent with the remainder of his decision in these cases. Indeed, the terminology, sentence structure, and diction used to explain the legal reasoning in these cases appears very similar to that of other most judicial decisions in Canada. Consider, for example, the length, language, and style of this sentence from
his decision in Flores CA:

under. The youngest was one. The plaintiff was a remarkable woman. In addition to her
own four, she was foster mother to four other children. To add to it, she was two months
pregnant with her fifth child” at 1075).
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Adopting, as I must, a functional approach to test the adequacy of
these instructions, and considering them as a whole, I am satisfied
that the “rolled-up” instructions in this case were not adequate to
the task set for them: to bring home to the jury their obligation to
consider the cumulative effect of the evidence, with a legitimate
bearing on the prosecutor’s proof of the fault element in murder, despite their rejection of any discrete defence to which that same evidence was relevant.89

This is not writing aimed at a lay reader (let alone an accused whose first
language is not English, as was the case with Melvin Flores90).
To be clear, relative to a great deal of case law, Justice Watt’s writing
in these decisions is clear, organized, and straightforward. However, that
his decisions are otherwise well-written relative to the decisions of some
other judges, and thus more accessible to those with legal training, does
not make them more comprehensible to an accused or a general, lay reader. Many of his decisions, including elements of those discussed here, are
highly technical. Like in the cases Henderson examined, Justice Watt analyzes and resolves the issues on appeal in these cases using a clear and
organized, but very much traditional style of legal writing. Adding an irreverent factual introduction to a legal opinion that is otherwise written
in a conventional style does not make the law more accessible to a nonlegal audience.
Justice Watt’s defenders have perhaps conflated his factual introductions in these cases with his clear, organized, and typically well-reasoned,
but thoroughly conventional legal writing in the remainder of these judgments. In fact, his introductions in these cases arguably make his judgments less clear and accessible both for the lay reader and for legal audiences.
In his “Primer of Opinion Writing”, George Rose Smith, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, highlighted for new appellate
judges the significance of the first paragraph of a decision, asserting that
its importance cannot be overemphasized.91 He argued that “the readability of an opinion is nearly always improved if the opening paragraph (occasionally it takes two) answers three questions”: what type of case is it;
which party is appealing; and what was the decision at trial?92 Smith suggested that the issues on appeal should also be identified in the first paragraph or two, if capable of summary.
89
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Justice Watt’s introductions generally do not serve this function.93
Consider, for instance, the first paragraph of his decision in R. v.
Paryniuk: “Looks can be deceiving. But not always. Sometimes, things are
as they appear. At least to the practised eye.”94 This paragraph does not
reveal to the reader the type of case, which party is appealing, the nature
of the trial decision, or the issues on appeal. Answers to these questions
are similarly absent from his first paragraph in R. v. Roks: “Things don’t
always work out according to plan. Failures occur at different times and
for different reasons. Sometimes, the flaw is in the plan. At other times,
the execution is faulty.”95 Likewise in United States v. Cavan: “Those who
persist in their pursuits have mixed results. Some succeed. Others fail.”96
While they are written in plain language, these introductory paragraphs
reveal virtually nothing about the cases they introduce.
Similarly, the dramatic openings in Flores CA, Bradey, Salah, and
Shafia do not disclose the nature of the appeal, the decision at trial, or the
specific issues on appeal. In Shafia, for instance, the reader is not provided with any of this information until the fifth paragraph of the decision.97
93
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The incongruence between the style of writing in his factual introductions
and the style of the remainder of these decisions to provide his reasoning,
and the uninformative nature of his literary openings (despite their plain
language), suggests that the accused was not the intended reader of these
decisions.
Again, the core of Justice Watt’s decisions in these cases are not written using a plain language style that is accessible to a non-legal audience.
His departure from conventional legal writing in the introductions to
these cases cannot be explained as an attempt at plain language, accessible and empathetic writing aimed at an accused. Given the style with
which he describes the violence in these cases, it is also difficult to conclude that they were written for the friends and family of these murdered
women and children.

II. The Public Audience for (Literary) Judgments
A third audience identified by successful applicants to the federal judiciary is the general public (and a subset of that public, the media). As already noted, given their online availability, it is reasonable to assume
that members of the public are increasingly reading judicial decisions.
In her application for elevation to the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Sheilah Martin suggests that the public is an important audience for
every court because
the legitimacy of judicial decision-making rests in large measure on
people believing that our legal system delivers justice. Judges seek
to encourage public confidence in the legal system and foster respect
for the rule of law at all times. Judicial decisions provide a powerful
opportunity to build public confidence and respect because they are
direct acts of communication.98

Similarly, in his application for appointment to Alberta’s superior
court Justice William deWitt states that
[m]aking members of the public feel respected and understood is an
important duty of a judge and is invaluable in promoting the public’s
respect for the court system and the administration of justice. Therefore, the general public is...an important audience for the decisions of
judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench.99
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Sheilah Martin, “The Honourable Sheilah Martin’s Questionnaire” (21 December 2017),
online: Office of the Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs Canada <www.fjacmf.gc.ca> [perma.cc/YG4S-HP6G].
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March 2017), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/677PD4FH].
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In her application, Justice Robyn Ryan Bell asserts that “every trial, hearing or appeal is an act of communication with the public.”100 How might
we assess Justice Watt’s acts of public communication?
The four decisions examined in Part II involved violence (or, in the
case of Salah, attempted violence) against women. Flores CA, Bradey and
Shafia, in particular, involved gender-based violence. Gender-based violence refers to acts of violence that are targeted against women because
they are women, or that disproportionately affect women.101 Bradey, for
example, involved rape, which is disproportionately perpetrated against
women by men.102 At the centre of Shafia was the issue of honour killings
motivated by a supposed failure on the part of the victim to comport with
puritanical sex and gender norms restricting the appearance and activities of women as a form of control. Flores CA, which will be discussed further in the paragraphs to follow, involved domestic violence by an expartner. Like rape, intimate partner violence is disproportionately perpetrated by men against women.103
Writing judgments involving gender-based violence for a public audience should trigger consideration of two interrelated factors specific to
this type of case. The first involves the current crisis of public faith in the
legal system’s ability to respond appropriately to incidents of genderbased harm.104 The second, related, factor involves the importance of rec100

Robyn M Ryan Bell, “The Honourable Justice Robyn M Ryan Bell’s Questionnaire” (5
May 2017), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/JN4MDXQH].
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& Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 11 July 2017)
at 6, 13.
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See Statistics Canada, Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends, Maire
Sinha, ed, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 25 February 2013)
(“[o]verall, men were responsible for 83% of violence committed against women, with
women accounting for the remaining 17%” at 14) [Sinha, Measuring Violence]. See also
ibid (“[women] were almost four times more likely than men to be victims of both
spousal violence and dating violence” at 20).
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See e.g. Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and
Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) at 87, 151. See also Blair
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A CASE STUDY OF JUSTICE DAVID WATT’S LITERARY JUDGMENTS

333

ognizing the social context and dynamics that produce gender-based violence.105
Despite initiatives like specialized courts, judicial education on gender-based harms, and independent legal advice for sexual assault complainants, survivors of gender-based violence continue to report significant deficiencies in the legal system’s response to the violence perpetrated
against them or their loved ones.106 Lack of faith in the criminal justice
process remains one of the main barriers to reporting experiences of sexual assault.107 It is not hyperbolic to assert a crisis of public confidence in
the ability of judges to recognize and respond appropriately to allegations
of sex and gender-based harm, particularly in view of recent high profile
sexual assault cases revealing dysfunction within the legal system.108 It is
reasonable to conclude that in Canada the law and judicial attitudes regarding gender-based violence have historically failed women.109

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 192 at 192; Sherene H Razack, Looking
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Between ‘Responsibilization’ and ‘Blaming the Victim’” (2005) 17:2 CJWL 283; Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under the Harper
Government” (2014) 67:2 SCLR 43 at 50–53; Sonia Lawrence, “Reflections on Judicial
Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin, eds, Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 193 at 198.
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Given this history and the current lack of public faith in the legal system, judicial writing for a public audience should not be irreverent or disrespectful in its descriptions of sexual assault, domestic violence, or intimate-partner murder. Rather, judgments in this area of law should reflect
adequate recognition of the social dynamics that surround and perpetuate
gender-based violence. Without adequate recognition of these dynamics,
judicial writing risks contributing to a well-founded public perception that
courts have failed to recognize the pervasive gender-based harms suffered
by women, particularly racialized women, Indigenous women, poor women, and women living with addiction.110 Many judges will have little in
common with these women’s lived experiences of gender-based violence.111
A continued shift in judicial culture towards greater recognition and
deeper understanding of gender-based violence is necessary. Any judicial
writing that risks impeding this cultural shift is both unfair to women
and likely to aggravate the loss of public faith in the legal system’s ability
to respond judiciously to incidents of gender-based harm. This is true regardless of the substantive legal reasoning or outcome in such decisions.

A. Judicial Writing for a Public Audience Should Not Be Irreverent or Impertinent When Describing Violence against Women
Justice Watt’s judgments in Flores CA, Bradey, and Shafia do not
suggest careful attention to the impact that judicial writing in this area
can have on the public’s faith in the legal system. These decisions include
irreverent descriptions of the gender-based violence that occurred in these
cases—descriptions which could have an adverse impact on public confidence in the legal system. For example, public perceptions of the judiciary’s response to gender-based violence are likely to be diminished by judicial writing that treats lightly the jealous rage that supposedly caused
an accused to brutally stab his ex-girlfriend to death, that uses pun when
describing the burning of a woman’s raped, tortured, and murdered body,
or that offers gratuitous details for stylistic effect when describing the
supposed “honour killings” of four women by members of their family.
One of the literary devices in Justice Watt’s introductions is humour.
A central claim advanced in support of judicial humour is that judges are
UBC Press, 2014) at 296–97; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and
‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397.
110

See e.g. Sheehy, supra note 110 at 87, 151. See also Crew, Gilbert & Sheehy, supra note
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Comack & Peter, supra note 110.
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human beings and the expectation that they perform their roles in a robotic fashion is neither reasonable nor desirable.112 Proponents of this argument suggest that judicial humour reveals a judge’s humanity, in contrast to the perception of judges as removed and distant.113 Jack Oakley
and Brian Opeskin summarize the claim as follows:
Greater tolerance for natural displays of humour would have the
beneficial effect of re-humanizing judges, and remolding their negative image as watchers from an ivory tower, disconnected from the
‘real’ people over whom they sit in judgment.114

Although the potential for “re-humanizing judges” in the eyes of the
public may be true of some judicial humour, it is unlikely that Justice
Watt’s introductions in Flores CA, Bradey, Salah and Shafia could have
that effect. His attempts at judicial humour in these cases may have the
opposite effect. Consider, for instance, his opening paragraphs in Bradey.
Humour concerning the rape, torture, and murder of a mentally disabled
woman is not appropriate. Justice Watt’s reference to the presence of
Kaitlin Cousineau’s beaten and burned dead body in Bradey’s basement
as “a problem” for the accused is not likely to re-humanize judges in the
eyes of the public. The use of humour in Bradey is more likely to reinforce
perceptions that law is made by detached judges in “ivory tower[s]” who
have lost sight of the fact that they are writing about things that have
happened to “real” people.

B. Judicial Writing for the Public Should Identify, Not Elide, the Social
Dynamics Surrounding Gender-Based Violence
In addition to irreverent descriptions, judicial accounts of violence
against women that fail to identify and articulate, or which obscure, the
gendered specificity of these crimes may also undermine public faith in
the legal system. Justice Watt’s literary introduction in Flores CA does
not identify, but rather obscures the social dynamics surrounding genderbased violence.
Recall that Melvin Flores murdered his ex-girlfriend, Cindy MacDonald, shortly after their break-up and upon learning that she had obtained
an abortion and was engaged in sexual relations with another man. In the

112

See e.g. The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, “On the Writing of Judgments” (1990) 64:11
Austl LJ 691 at 697–99; Anleu, Mack & Tutton, supra note 79 at 627; Jordan, supra
note 86 at 701.

113

See Anleu, Mack & Tutton, supra note 79 (“[h]umour can be an ‘expression of humanity
and individuality in contrast to the conventional emphasis on distance’” at 627).

114

Jack Oakley & Brian Opeskin, “Banter from the Bench: The Use of Humour in the Exercise of Judicial Functions” (2016) 42 Austl Bar Rev 82 at 95.

336

(2018) 64:2 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

weeks between the break-up and the murder, Flores repeatedly called
MacDonald’s aunt, and asked her, her husband, and MacDonald’s grandmother to persuade MacDonald to marry him.115 Flores left MacDonald a
series of loud, abusive voicemails in which he called her “a fucking bitch,”
threatened to murder her and said that if he could not have her, no one
would.116 He told MacDonald’s aunt that he would kill her if she did not
resume the relationship.117 He breached a court order during this time period which prohibited him from contacting the victim.118 During his discussions with police and at his second trial, Flores described how he “went
crazy” on the night of the murder after MacDonald told him that she had
had an abortion and was currently pregnant from sex with another
man.119
Justice Watt’s introductory description of the events preceding the
murder of Cindy MacDonald was as follows: “Cindy made it clear to Melvin that their relationship was over. But Melvin continued his pursuit. He
enlisted the assistance of some of Cindy’s relatives to convince her to marry him.”120 Based on the reported facts, Melvin Flores’s behaviour towards
his ex-girlfriend appears to be a clear example of stalking by a possessive
and angry man. To label it as a “pursuit” misrepresents and romanticizes
what occurred and also renders invisible the gender-based nature of the
violence in this case.
Stalking, or criminal harassment, includes repeated, threatening
communications which would cause a reasonable person to fear for their
safety.121 Researchers have demonstrated a clear link between stalking
and intimate partner violence.122 Women are far more likely to be the victims of intimate partner violence than are men.123 Stalkers of ex-partners
115
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are overwhelmingly male and tend to “react with rage to perceived or actual rejection.”124 The murder of women by their intimate partners or former intimate partners is often motivated by jealousy and claims to possession.125 Men are more likely to murder an intimate partner as she
leaves, or attempts to end, the relationship.126
It is critically important to the physical safety of women that the legal
system and its actors be cognizant of the behavioural patterns that precede, and the social dynamics that produce, intimate femicide. Narratives
that sentimentalize stalking behaviour impede greater understanding of
the role that these factors play in the murder of women by their partners
and former partners. When written by a judge and read by the public,
they risk affirming the perception that courts are unable to understand or
unwilling to protect women from gender-based violence.
Justice Watt’s characterization of Flores’s stalking behaviour as a
“pursuit” is not the only example of him romanticizing the gender-based
violence in Flores CA. His opening paragraph reads almost as if he is telling an ill-fated love story. Recall that he begins his description of the case
by writing: “They met in a bar in London. Melvin Flores and Cindy MacDonald. Soon, they became lovers.”127 Later he writes: “[Flores] wanted to
get married. Cindy did not share her lover’s excitement.”128 Where the accused and the victim met was not relevant to the issues on appeal. This
factual detail appears to have been included to facilitate the opening narrative. Justice Watt referred to the accused and his victim as “lovers”
twice in this paragraph. The choice of language and the content of this
paragraph depict a story of love and courtship, rather than sexual possessiveness, jealousy, and murderous rage.
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The partial defense of provocation—raised by the accused in R. v. Flores and one of the issues on appeal—reduces what would be a murder
conviction to manslaughter.129 It is premised on the notion that human
frailties “sometimes lead people to act irrationally and impulsively.”130 For
an accused to avail himself of the defence, there must (1) be an air of reality to the assertion that the deceased’s indictable criminal conduct would
cause an ordinary person to lose self-control; (2) that it did cause the accused to lose control and act suddenly; (3) before his “passion” could
“cool”.131
The origins of this defence are deeply gendered.132 It was frequently
used to show compassion for men who had murdered their wives upon
discovering their infidelity.133 Reliance on the partial defence of provocation in this context was premised on the belief that women were the sexual property of their husbands and that their adultery was a profound violation of the husband’s proprietary interests.134 Legal scholars have shown
how the gendered assumptions underpinning this defence continue to inform its application to reduce the murder convictions of men who kill intimate partners or former partners who have attempted to leave the relationship.135
Whether the appeal in R. v. Flores required a gender analysis, given
the accused’s reliance on provocation as a defence, is a separate question.
To obscure the gender-based nature of the violence in this case by telling a
romanticized, saccharine story of courtship gone wrong may reinforce
public perceptions that the judiciary does not understand or respond appropriately to the social problem of violence against women.
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Justice Watt is an accomplished jurist and an expert in criminal law,
jury instructions, and the law of evidence.136 His knowledge of these areas
of law is matched by his organized, clear, and analytically rigorous legal
reasoning. His decisions are frequently relied upon by his judicial colleagues.137 These attributes and accomplishments increase the potentially
adverse impact of these literary introductions on public confidence in the
judiciary. Consider this quote reportedly taken from an anonymous Manitoba judge in response to Justice Watt’s description of Cindy MacDonald’s
murder by Melvin Flores: “This is another excellent piece of work by one
of Canada’s finest criminal law jurists ... It is [a] must-read for all new
judges in particular, and the rest of us, too. The first few pages are a tad
whimsical but neither offensive nor demeaning.”138
It seems reasonable to suggest that Cindy MacDonald’s brother, or her
father, might consider Justice Watt’s attempt at humour and the use of
blunt imagery to describe her murder—that Melvin “closed the book” on
their relationship with a “butcher’s knife”—offensive and demeaning.
Moreover, we should expect our judges, including this judge from Manitoba, to know that whimsy ought not to play a role in authoring a judicial
decision about the “starkly horrific”139 murder of a woman by her exboyfriend. Would we want other judges to emulate Justice Watt’s writing
style in these cases? What would be the impact on public perceptions of
the judiciary and the legal profession more broadly if many, or most,
judges opened criminal law decisions involving violence against women in
this manner?
The Court of Appeal for Ontario typically hears cases in panels of
three, and did so in Flores CA. That Justice Watt’s concurring colleagues
in Flores CA, Justices LaForme and MacFarland, failed to provide their
colleague with a much-needed check by authoring a separate, concurring
opinion that agreed with his legal reasoning but explicitly stated that they
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did not endorse his introduction, speaks to the need for a shift in judicial
culture.140 In terms of his substantive knowledge and legal reasoning, Justice Watt is “one of Canada’s finest criminal law jurists.”141 In terms of developing a judiciary which both has and is perceived to have a deeper understanding, and articulated recognition, of the social conditions and dynamics that perpetuate gender-based violence, Justice Watt’s status as a
highly esteemed criminal law jurist makes introductions like the one he
authored in Flores CA more problematic.
Whether Justice Watt’s unorthodox introductions in these cases were
aimed at a public audience is unknown. That the opening descriptions of
violence against women in these decisions could be perceived by members
of the public as disrespectful and insufficiently cognizant of the social dynamics that perpetuate gender-based violence seems likely.

III. The Legal Profession as Audience for (Literary) Judgments
Unsurprisingly, applicants to the federal judiciary consistently identify lawyers, legal academics, and other judges as a primary audience for
judicial decisions. As Justice Paciocco writes, “in our common law system,
jurists learn the law from one another. The law builds and develops
through shared efforts. If lawyers and jurists are not communicating
about the law, it cannot progress”.142
The legal community is the most likely audience for Justice Watt’s decisions in Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah. The fact that the legal
reasoning in these decisions is written in a conventional legal style, largely inaccessible to a lay audience, supports this conclusion. But this does
not explain how a legal audience is served by these introductions—
particularly given the disjuncture between them and the remainder of the
decision in these cases.
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A. Stylistic Departures from Conventional Judicial Writing Must Have
Purpose
Academics and judges who have commented on literary judgments
seem to agree that the utility (and appropriateness) of departing from a
traditional style of judicial writing hinges on whether the departure is
genuinely relevant to the decision.143 One of George Rose Smith’s primary
examples of injudicious literary judgments is decisions written as poetry.144 Smith illustrates the defects with this type of judicial writing
through analysis of several American cases in which judges have written
parts of their decision in verse.145 The shortcomings he identifies include
cases in which the verse serves as a distraction, the poem states neither
the facts nor the law (which are included instead in footnotes), or those in
which there is no discernible purpose of writing in this manner.146 In
short, his critique is that in too many of these literary attempts, form
trumps substance. Noting that neither the law nor the facts of a case can
be stated as well in poetry as in prose, he asks: “What, then, is the reason
for the muse’s intrusion? Apparently the author either seeks to be amusing (humorous) or seeks to display cleverness or ingenuity. No other possible explanation comes to mind.”147 As explained in the paragraphs to follow, the literary stylings in Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah cannot
be said to be of genuine relevance to the case to be decided.
In Creating Legal Worlds, Henderson notes that Justice Watt’s openings, unlike Lord Denning’s, sometimes include background facts that are
irrelevant to the issues being decided.148 This is also true in the cases examined here. For example, many of the details he included in his opening
ten paragraphs in Shafia were irrelevant to the issues on appeal in that
case.149 Henderson suggests that, unlike Lord Denning’s, Justice Watt’s
“narrative opening[s] and overview[s]” do not clarify, or even reveal, the
relevant legal issue(s).150 Examples of this, and of the disjuncture between
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the style of writing in the introductions and the legal reasoning in these
cases were considered in Part III.
Most significant for this discussion is Henderson’s observation that “in
Denning’s judgments, most of the time, style and substance “are fused in
unity”; in Watt’s judgments, at least some of the time, style is “something
added to substance as a mere protuberant adornment.”151 Henderson is
quoting Benjamin Cardozo’s 1925 essay on “Law and Literature” in this
passage. One need look no further than Justice Cardozo’s decision in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.152 to find an example of judicial writing in which literary style and substance are “fused in unity.”153
Palsgraf is a famous American case in which the dispute was whether
one is liable in negligence for injuries that occurred following a series of
unforeseeable events. In concluding that a defendant owes a duty of care
only to those who, to a reasonable person, would foreseeably be within the
range of danger created by the defendant, Cardozo wrote: “The orbit of the
danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of
the duty.”154 Cardozo’s “eye of ordinary vigilance” and its “orbit” fully encapsulate the legal rule that he adopts. While his legal conclusion would
have been more accessible if he had written it in plain language,
Cardozo’s use of a literary device in Palsgraf to explicate the legal standard for proximity was genuinely relevant. It can be juxtaposed with the
introductions in Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia, and Salah.
If these literary introductions do not advance the legal reasoning in
these cases, what purpose do they serve? Justice Watt’s audience in the
legal community would include his judicial colleagues, lawyers, legal
commentators, justice reporters, bloggers, legal scholars as well as law
students. As Higdon observes, legal writing is technical and not typically
aimed at amusing or entertaining the reader.155 Is the intended purpose of
Justice Watt’s introductions to capture the attention of legal readers who
may have become weary of reading case law? This seems plausible, given
their evocative imagery and dramatic tone. In his examination of law as a
unique form of narrative, Simon Stern argues that a key ingredient in the
lure of literary narrative which is lacking in conventional legal judgments
is “the drive, fueled by uncertainty and anticipation, that propels readers
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on toward the conclusion.”156 Perhaps Justice Watt’s introductions in
these cases are meant to create a sense of uncertainty and anticipation in
the legal reader, driving them to consume the remainder of the judgment.
Having identified the likely audience for Flores CA, Bradey, Shafia
and Salah (the legal community) and a plausible explanation as to the
purpose of beginning each of these judgments with this type of introduction (to capture the legal reader’s interest), it seems reasonable to query
whether the departure from conventional legal writing in these cases
achieves this purpose.
Consider first the capacity of these introductions to captivate a legal
audience. It is certainly true, as already noted, that Justice Watt’s unorthodox writing has attracted attention within the legal community.157
Moreover, his introductions are likely to capture the attention of the legal
reader, given their combination of irreverence, stark imagery and attempts at humour. Less clear is whether this style of writing is likely to
sustain the reader’s interest. Recall that in each of these judgments the
writing quickly reverts to a conventional legal style and that the literary
devices employed in these introductions do not advance the legal reasoning in these decisions. Moreover, while this type of introduction is likely to
evoke a particular reaction from the reader—a sense of uncertainty or anticipation that encourages them to read on—at least in the context of cases involving tragic circumstances like the ones present in Flores CA,
Bradey, Salah and Shafia, legal readers may have an additional reaction
to this type of judicial writing that is undesirable.
Take, for example, students of law—who spend the better part of three
years reading almost exclusively case law.158 Researchers have found an
adverse relationship between the emotional and psychological health of
law students and the dominant pedagogical approach used in law
schools—a method which requires them to approach every issue and every case from a rational, analytical perspective that excludes emotion,
moral consideration, and their overarching ethical commitments.159 Some
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researchers have suggested that repeatedly requiring students of law to
disconnect from these aspects of themselves promotes cynicism, moral
ambiguity, and feelings of alienation and unhappiness, as well as confusion and disillusionment with the law.160 At least historically, law schools
have been much better at teaching students to set aside their moral concerns and desire for justice in an effort to maintain analytical clarity, than
at helping them to understand how and when their compassion for others
should inform their work as lawyers.161
Judicial writing that describes horrific acts of violence in a manner
that suggests complete detachment from the people impacted by this violence, and the effect that this writing will have on those people, seems
likely to aggravate the unintended but problematic consequences of conventional legal pedagogy. Judicial descriptions of violence that use puns,
parodies of Lord Denning, or jokes, and that as a result make light of
stabbing a woman repeatedly or burning two children to death, may contribute to law students’ sense of disillusionment with, and cynicism toward the law and legal system. This concern would outweigh any interest
in easing the tedium that sometimes comes with the study of law.
Nor is it desirable to affirm or promote in the legal profession more
broadly a sense of detachment from the human suffering that lawyers and
judges are frequently required to address. Judicial writing that obscures
the humanity underpinning many of the problems law is expected to resolve benefits neither the legal profession nor the public.

B. The Motivation for Authoring Literary Judgments Should Not Be SelfInterest
Some commentators have asserted that judges may author literary
judgments to alleviate boredom.162 A similar argument is advanced by
Adalberto Jordan, who suggests that creative judicial writing “is a way for
judges, especially appellate judges, to achieve self-fulfillment and derive
needed satisfaction from their jobs.”163
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Judges hold positions of power and social respect. They enjoy constitutionally protected independence and security of tenure.164 They are among
the most highly paid public servants.165 Most retire with generous pensions.166 Alleviation of boredom should not influence how a judge writes a
decision. Allowing occupational tedium or lack of individual selffulfillment to inform their style of judicial writing is to allow self-interest
to affect their decisions. It is universally accepted that judges are not entitled to allow self-interest to inform the execution of their judicial duties.
Certainly they are not entitled to allow self-interest to adversely impact
performance of their judicial role.
Judges who have become bored with writing legal opinions or dissatisfied with the stylistic constraints that judicial authorship imposes upon
them should find other outlets for their creative leanings: judges can write
poetry or crime fiction in their spare time,167 or pursue legal scholarship which better lends itself to different styles of legal writing. Smith suggests
writing a fictitious decision if judicial humour is a must.168
The alleviation of boredom is not a compelling justification for departing from conventional legal writing. Simply put, in the context of criminal
law jurisprudence the mitigation of one’s work-related tedium will never
serve as an appropriate justification for using the facts of someone else’s
tragedy for purposes of self-entertainment.

Conclusion: Writing with Humility
In articulating what he “has always loved about the law” Justice
Paciocco writes:
when a court is convened it represents a coming together of a society. The trial is a morality play in which the judge speaks publicly for
the community in a ceremony designed to redress an alleged transgression or wrong and to reinforce those values raised by the law.
The enterprise could hardly be more important. The audience to be
164
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addressed, if the law is to work to its potential, is multi-faceted, and
each segment of that audience must be spoken to by the judge.169

Writing that speaks to each of these three important constituencies for
judicial decisions must be empathetic, accessible, and capable of protecting and promoting the public’s perception of the judiciary and the legal
system (particularly in problematic contexts like gender-based violence).
It should advance legal knowledge and understanding within the legal
profession. It should deploy literary devices and humour only where doing
so is relevant, advances the legal reasoning in the decision, and serves a
purpose that is consistent with these other criteria (empathy, sensitivity,
consistency, promotion of public confidence in the judiciary, and accessibility). This is a demanding standard. What should guide judges in writing decisions that reflect a style, structure, diction, and tone that can
speak simultaneously to these very different facets of their audience? One
guiding factor may be humility.
As Justice Alice Woolley argues, “[j]udges need to strive for humility—
to recognize it as a virtue. Judges may be independent, but their independence exists to deliver justice to the public, not to give judges a public
forum to say what they want, when they want, to whom they want. It requires, in short, humility.”170
In her exploration of humility as a judicial virtue Amalia Amaya argues that, “a critical component of humility, as many have argued, is the
exhibition of an attitude of proper care and respect for the well-being of
others and a sensibility to avoid boastful behavior that might cause pain
and despair.”171 Amaya notes that intellectual humility disposes judges to
listen carefully to the views of others, and helps judges to learn from others. Amaya focuses on the social-relational aspects of humility: “humility
involves a profound appreciation of the equality of all human beings, in
spite of any other kind of differences that there might be, and is distinctively valuable in that it fosters egalitarian social-relations.”172 Humility
promotes empathy and an attitude of respect toward others regardless of
differences in social position.
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Judges are among the most privileged members of our society.173 They
are privileged not only in terms of their education, salary, and social power but often as well in terms of their race, gender, and socioeconomic
background.174 They do not come from all walks of life. Typically, they are
not representative of the people of whom they most frequently sit in
judgment, particularly in the criminal law context.175 Judges enjoy tenure
and enormous independence relative to other public servants.176 Transparency regarding their appointment, education as judges, their treatment of, and engagement with, staff and law clerks, and their intra-court
administrative processes more generally, is almost non-existent.177 Their
circumstances and cloistered working conditions may produce incomplete
perspectives on social dynamics, the diversity of living conditions in Canada, and systematic inequalities—all of which are critically important factors in the criminal justice context generally and in the adjudication of
cases involving gender-based violence in particular.
In view of their insulated working conditions, the limited feedback
they receive, and the narrow demographic from which they have historically been drawn judges are at risk of failing to fully account for the social
conditions of those involved in or connected to the cases of horror and
tragedy they are required to judge. Humility helps to bridge the gap be-
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tween judges and the lives over whom they preside (including the lives of
both those accused of criminal offences and those who are the victims of
violent offences). In other words, humility mitigates the disconnect that
may occur between judges and the individuals whose lives and loved ones
are affected by their judgments.
Judicial writing that is guided by humility is more likely to be empathetic and accessible to as broad an audience as possible. Writing guided
by humility is less likely to diminish public confidence in the judiciary by,
for example, using the factual circumstances surrounding a case of gender-based violence to make a joke or develop a pun. Judicial writing guided by humility is less likely to sacrifice relevance, respect, and clarity in
pursuit of style.
Writing judgments that radically impact the lives of others is an arduous and unenviable task. It is a responsibility that few are given, but the
performance of which affects many. Certainly it is much less onerous to
produce legal scholarship than legal judgments. Nevertheless, given the
impact that these decisions can have, judges should be expected to speak
to a broad and disparate readership in a manner that reflects the public
and private needs of the role they fulfill.

